Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we design protocols for distributed latency minimization in atomic congestion games based on such behavior. We propose to study concurrent imitation dynamics that emerge when each agent samples another agent and possibly imitates this agents' strategy if the anticipated latency gain is sufficiently large. Our main focus is on convergence properties. Using a potential function argument, we show that these dynamics converge in a monotonic fashion to stable states. In such a state none of the agents can improve their latency by imitating others.
INTRODUCTION
We study imitation dynamics that emerge if myopic agents concurrently imitate each other in order to improve on their own situation. In scenarios for which agents have little or no experience upon which they can base their decisions, or in which precise knowledge about the available options and their consequences is absent, it is a good strategy to imitate successful behavior. Thus, it is not surprising that such behavior can frequently be observed, and has been studied intensively in economics and game theory [20, 27] .
In this paper we use the imitation paradigm to design protocols and study dynamics in the context of symmetric congestion games [24] . As an example of such a game consider a network congestion game in which agents strive to allocate paths with minimum latency between the same source-sink pair in a network. The latency of a path equals the sum of the latencies of the edges in that path and the latency of an edge depends on the number of agents sharing it.
Our main focus is the design and analysis of a simple imitation protocol, which can be used by agents in decentralized scenarios for latency minimization. Using the protocol agents strive to improve their individual latencies over time by imitating others in a concurrent and round-based fashion. Our Imitation Protocol has several appealing properties: it is simple, stateless, based on local information, and is compatible with the selfish incentives of the agents. Thus, it is a well-suited tool for implementing load-balacing and latency minimization in distributed systems with decentralized control and non-cooperative agents, such as e.g. in the channel allocation process in wireless networks. The Imitation Protocol consists of a sampling and a migration step. First, each agent samples another agent uniformly at random. Then he considers the latency gain that he would have by adopting the strategy of the sampled agent, under the assumption that no-one else changes his strategy. If this latency gain is not too small our agent adopts the sampled strategy with a migration probability mainly depending on the anticipated latency gain. The major technical challenge in designing such a concurrent protocol is to avoid overshooting effects. Overshooting occurs if too many agents sample other agents currently using the same strategy, and if all of them migrate towards it. In this case their latency might be greater than before the migration. In order to avoid overshooting, the migration probabilities have to be defined appropriately without sacrificing the benefit of concurrency. We propose to scale the migration probabilities by the elasticity of the latency functions in order to avoid overshooting. The elasticity of a function at point x describes the proportional growth of the function value as a result of a proportional growth of its argument. Note that in case of polynomial latency functions with positive coefficients and maximum degree d the elasticity is upper bounded by d.
A natural solution concept in this scenario is imitationstability. A state is imitation-stable if no more improvements are possible based on the Imitation Protocol. We analyse convergence properties with respect to this solution concept.
Our Results
As our first result we prove that the Imitation Protocol succeeds in avoiding overshooting effects and converges in a monotonic fashion (Section 3). More precisely, we show that a well-known potential function (Rosenthal [24] ) decreases on expectation as long as the system is not yet at an imitation-stable state. Thus, the potential is a supermartingale and eventually reaches a local minimum, corresponding to an imitation-stable state. Hence, as a corollary, we see that an imitation-stable state is reached in pseudopolynomial time.
Our main result, presented in Section 3.2, however, is a much stronger bound on the time to reach approximate imitation-stable states. What is a natural definition of approximately stable states in our setting? By repeatedly sampling other agents, an agent gets to know the average latency of the system. It is approximately satisfied, if it does not sustain a latency much larger than the average. Hence, we say that a state is approximately stable if almost all agents are almost satisfied. More precisely, we consider states in which at most a δ-fraction of the agents deviates by more that an -fraction (in any direction) from the average latency. We show that the expected time to reach such a state is polynomial in the inverse of the approximation parameters δ and as well as in the maximum elasticity of the latency functions, and logarithmic in the ratio between maximum and minimum potential. Hence, if the maximum latency of a path is fixed, the time is only logarithmic in the number of agents and independent of the size of the strategy space and the number of resources.
We complement these results by various lower bounds. First, it is clear that pseudopolynomial time is required to reach exact imitation-stable states. This follows from the fact that there exist states in which all latency improvements are arbitrarily small, resulting in arbitrarily small migration probabilities. Hence, already a single step may take pseudopolynomially long. As a concept of approximate stable states one could have required all agents to be approximately satisfied, rather than only all but a δ-fraction. This, however, would require to wait a polynomial number of rounds for the last agent to become approximately satisfied, as opposed to our logarithmic bound.
In the full version of this paper we will consider sequential imitation processes in which only one agent may move at a time. We extend a construction from [2] to show that there exist instances in which the shortest sequence of imitations that leads to an imitation-stable state is exponentially long.
The Imitation Protocol has one drawback: It is not innovative in the following sense. It might happen with small but non-zero probability that all agents currently using the same strategy P migrate towards other strategies and no other agent migrates towards P . In this case, the knowledge about the existence of strategy P is lost and cannot be regained. For singleton games, i. e., games in which each strategy is a singleton set, in which empty links have latency zero, we show in Section 4 that the probability of this event occurring in a polynomial number of rounds is negligible. This also has an important consequence: The cost of a state to which the Imitation Protocol converges is, on expectation, not much worse than the cost of a Nash equilibrium. More precisely, we show for the case of linear latency functions that the expected cost of a state to which the Imitation Protocol converges is within a constant factor of the optimal solution.
Alternatively, in cases, in which convergence to a Nash equilibrium is required, we can adjust the dynamics and occasionally let agents use a suitably defined Exploration Protocol. Using such a protocol, agents sample other strategies directly instead of sampling them by looking at other agents. In the full version of this paper, we will show that a suitable definition of such a protocol and a suitable combination with the Imitation Protocol guarantee convergence to Nash equilibria in the long run.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that considers concurrent protocols for atomic congestion games that are not restricted to parallel links and linear latency functions. Results similar to the ones presented here have been obtained for the non-atomic Wardrop model in [15] where the analysis is significantly simplified by the fact that probabilistic effects do not have to be taken into account.
Due to spacial constraints many proof details are omitted and will be given in a full version of the paper.
Related Work
Rosenthal [24] proves that every congestion game possesses a Nash equilibrium, and that better response dynamics converge to Nash equilibria. In these dynamics agents have complete knowledge, and, in every round, only a single agent deviates to a better strategy than it currently uses. Fabrikant et al. [12] , however, observe that, in general, from an appropriately chosen initial state it takes exponentially many steps until agents finally reach an equilibrium. This negative result still holds in games with -greedy agents, i. e., in games in which agents only deviate if their latency decreases by a relative factor of at least 1+ [2, 8, 26] . Moreover, Fabrikant et al. [12] prove that, in general, computing a Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete. Their result still holds in the case of asymmetric network congestion games. In addition, Skopalik and Vöcking [26] prove that even computing an approximate Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete. On the positive side, best response dynamics converge quickly in singleton and matroid congestion games [2, 21] . Additionally, Chien and Sinclair [8] consider the convergence time of best response dynamics to approximate Nash equilibria in symmetric games. They prove fast convergence to approximate Nash equilibria provided that the latency of a resource increases by at most a factor for each additional user. Finally, Goldberg [18] considers a protocol applied to a scenario where n weighted users assign load to m parallel links and the latency equals the load of a resource. In this protocol, randomly selected agents move sequentially, and migrate to a randomly selected resource if this improves their latency. The expected time to reach a Nash equilibrium is pseudopolynomial. Results considering other protocols and links with latency functions are presented in [10] .
The social cost of (approximate) Nash equilibria in congestion games has been subject to numerous studies. The most prominent concept has been the price of anarchy [22] , which is the ratio of the worst cost of any Nash equilibrium over the cost of an optimal assignment. Roughgarden and Tardos [25] conducted the first study of general, nonatomic congestion games and showed a tight bound of 4/3 for the price of anarchy with linear latency functions. For atomic games and linear latencies, Awerbuch et al. [3] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [9] show a tight bound of 2.5. The special case of (weighted) singleton games has been of particularly strong interest, and we refer the reader to [23, chapter 20] for an introduction to the numerous results. In terms of dynamics, Awerbuch et al. [4] consider the number of best-response steps required to reach a desirable state, which has a social cost only a constant factor larger than that of a social optimum. They show that even in congestion games with linear latencies there are exponentially long best-response sequences for reaching such a desirable state. In contrast, Fanelli et al. [13] show that for linear latency functions there are also much faster best response sequences that reach a desirable state after at most Θ(n log log n) steps.
Recently, concurrent protocols have been studied in various models and under various assumptions. Even-Dar and Mansour [11] consider concurrent protocols in a setting where the links have speeds. However, their protocols require global knowledge in the sense that the users must be able to determine the set of underloaded and overloaded links. Given this knowledge, the convergence time is doubly logarithmic in the number of agents. In [5] the authors consider a distributed protocol for the case that the latency equals the load that does not rely on this knowledge. Their bounds on the convergence time are also doubly logarithmic in the number of agents but polynomial in the number of links. In [6] the results are generalized to the case of weighted jobs. In this case, the convergence time is only pseudopolynomial, i. e., polynomial in the number of users, links, and in the maximum weight. Finally, Fotakis et al. [17] consider a scenario with latency functions for every resource. Their protocol involves local coordination among the agents sharing a resource. For the family of games in which the number of agents asymptotically equals the number of resources they prove fast convergence to almost Nash equilibria. Intuitively, an almost Nash equilibrium is a state in which there are not too many too expensive and too cheap resources. In [1] , a load balancing scenario is considered in which no information about the target resource is available. The authors present an efficient protocol in which the migration probability depends purely on the cost of the currently selected strategy.
In [15] the authors consider congestion games in the nonatomic Wardrop model, where an infinite population of agents carries an infinitesimal amount of load each. They consider a protocol similar to ours and prove that with respect to approximate equilibria it behaves like an FPTAS, i. e., it reaches an approximate equilibrium in time polynomial in the approximation parameters and the representation length of the instance. In contrast to our work the analysis of the continuous model does not have to take into account probabilistic effects.
Our protocol is based on the notion of imitation, a concept frequently applied in evolutionary game theory. For an introduction to imitation dynamics, see, e g., [20, 27] .
CONGESTION GAMES AND IMITATION DYNAMICS
In this section, we provide a formal description of our model. We define congestion games in terms of networks, that is, the strategy space of each agent corresponds to the set of paths connecting a particular source-sink pair in a network. We use this terminology only for convenience, and our results are independent of this definition. They continue to hold for general symmetric congestion games, in which strategy spaces of agents might not be efficiently searchable. Furthermore, we introduce the slope and the elasticity of latency functions, and give a precise definition of the Imitation Protocol.
Symmetric (Network) Congestion Games
A symmetric network congestion game is given by a tuple (G, (s, t), N , ( e ) e∈E ), where G = (V, E) denotes a network with vertices V and m directed edges E, and s ∈ V and t ∈ V denote a source and a sink vertex. Furthermore, N denotes a set of n agents, and ( e ) e∈E a family of nondecreasing and differentiable latency functions e : R ≥0 → R ≥0 . We assume that for all e ∈ E, the latency functions satisfy e (x) > 0 for all x > 0. The strategy space of all agents equals the set of paths P connecting the source s with the sink t. If G consists of two nodes s and t only, which are connected by a set of parallel links, then we call the game a singleton game. Let p dente the number of paths, i. e., p = |P|. A state x of the game is a vector (x P ) P ∈P where x P denotes the number of agents utilizing path P in state x, and x e = P e x P is the congestion of edge e ∈ E in state x. The latency of edge e in state x is given by e (x e ), and the latency of path P ∈ P is P (x) = e∈P e (x e ). The latency of a agent is the latency of the path it chooses.
For brevity, for all P ∈ P, let 1 P denote the p-dimensional unit vector with the one in position P . In state x an agent has an incentive to switch from path P to path Q if this would strictly decrease its latency, i. e., if P (x) > Q (x + 1 Q − 1 P ). We denote the latency gain experienced in this situation by
If no agent has an incentive to change its strategy, then x is at a Nash equilibrium. It is well known [24] , that the set of Nash equilibria corresponds to the set of states that minimize the potential function Φ(x) = e∈E x e i=1 e (i). In the following, let Φ * = min x Φ(x) be the minimum potential. Note that due to our definition of the latency functions Φ * > 0. For every path P ∈ P let + P (x) = P (x + 1 P ). Note that for every path Q ∈ P +
x P n P (x) denote the average latency of the paths in state x, and let L + av (x) = P ∈P
x P n P (x + 1 P ). Finally, let max = max x max P ∈P P (x) denote the maximum latency of any path. Throughout this paper, whenever we consider a fixed state x we simply drop the argument (x) from Φ, P , + P , ∆ P Q , L av , and L + av .
Elasticity and Slope
To bound the steepness of the latency functions and the effect that overshooting may have, we consider the elasticity of the latency functions. Let d denote an upper bound on the elasticity of the latency functions, i. e.,
. Now given a latency function with elasticity d, it holds that for any x and α ≥ 1, e (α x) ≤ e (x) · α d and for 0 ≤ α < 1,
As an example, the function a x d has elasticity d.
For almost empty resources, we will also need an upper bound on the slope of the latency functions. Let ν e denote the maximum slope on almost empty edges, i. e., we define ν e = max x∈{1,...,d} { e (x) − e (x − 1)}. Finally, for P ∈ P, let ν P = e∈P ν e and choose ν such that ν ≥ max P ∈P ν P .
The Imitation Protocol
Our Imitation Protocol (Protocol 1) proceeds in two steps. First, a agent samples another agent uniformly at random. The agent then migrates with a certain probability from its old path P to the sampled path Q depending on the anticipated relative latency gain ∆ P Q / P (x) and on the elasticity of the latency functions. Our analysis concentrates on dynamics that result from the protocol being executed by the agents in parallel in a round-based fashion. These dynamics generate a sequence of states x(0), x(1), . . .. The resulting dynamics converge to a state that is stable in the sense that imitation cannot produce further progress, i. e., x(t + 1) = x(t) with probability 1. Such a state is called an imitation-stable state. In other words, a state is imitationstable if it is -Nash with = ν with respect to the strategy space restricted to the current support. Here, -Nash means that no agent can improve its own payoff unilaterally by more than .
As discussed in the introduction, the main difficulty in the design of the protocol is to bound overshooting effects. To get an intuition of this problem, consider two parallel Protocol 1 Imitation Protocol, repeatedly executed by all agents in parallel.
Let P denote the path of the agent in state x. Sample another agent uniformly at random. Let Q denote its path. if ∆ P Q (x) > ν then with probability
links of which the first has the constant latency function 1 (x) = c and the second has the latency function 2 (x) = x d . Recall that the elasticity of 2 is d. Furthermore, assume that only a small number of agents x 2 utilizes link 2 whereas the majority of n − x 2 users utilizes link 1. Let b = c − x d 2 > 0 denote the latency difference between the two links. A simple calculation shows that using the protocol without the damping factor 1/d, the expected latency increase on link 2 would be Ω(b · d), overshooting the balanced state by a factor d. For this reason, we reduce the migration probability accordingly. The constant λ will be determined later.
Note that the arguments in the last paragraph hold for the expected load changes. Our protocol, however, has to take care of probabilistic effects, i. e., the realized migration vector may differ from its expectation. Typically, we can use the elasticity to bound the impact of this effect. However, if the congestion on an edge is very small, i. e., less than d, then the number of joining agents is not concentrated sharply enough around its expectation. In order to compensate for this, we add an additional requirement that agents only migrate if the anticipated latency gain is at least ν and use this to bound probabilistic effects if the congestion of the edge is less than d. Let us remark that we will see below (Theorem 9) that for a large class of singleton games it is very unlikely, that an edge will ever have a load of d or less, so the protocol will behave in the same way with high probability for a polynomial number of rounds even if this additional requirement is dropped.
GENERAL STRATEGY SPACES
In this section we consider imitation dynamics that emerge if in each round agents concurrently apply the Imitation Protocol. At first, we observe that imitation dynamics converge to imitation stable states since in each round the potential Φ(x) decreases in expectation. From this result we derive a pseudopolynomial upper bound on the convergence time to imitation-stable states.
Convergence to Imitation-Stable States
Consider two states x and x as well as a migration vector ∆x = (∆x P ) P ∈P such that x = x + ∆x. We may imagine ∆x as the result of one round of the Imitation Protocol although the following lemma is independent of how ∆x is constructed. Furthermore, we consider ∆x to be composed of a set of migrations of agents between pairs of paths, i. e., ∆x P Q denotes the number of agents who switch from path P to path Q, and ∆x P denotes the total increase or decrease of the number of agents utilizing path P , that is, ∆x P = Q∈P (x QP − x P Q ). Also, let ∆x e = P e ∆x P denote the induced change of the number of agents utilizing edge e ∈ E. In order to prove convergence, we define the virtual potential gain V P Q (x, ∆x) = x P Q · (−∆ P Q (x)) which is the sum of the potential gains each agent migrating from path P to path Q would contribute to ∆Φ if each of them was the only migrating agent. Note that if an agent improves the latency of his path, the potential gain is negative. The sum of all virtual potential gains is a very rough lower bound on the true potential gain ∆Φ(x, ∆x) = Φ(x + ∆x) − Φ(x). In order to compensate for the fact that agents concurrently change their strategies, consider the error term on an edge e ∈ E:
if ∆x e > 0 Subsequently, we show that the sum of the virtual potential gains and the error terms is indeed an upper bound on the true potential gain ∆Φ(x, ∆x). A similar result is shown in [16] for a continuous model.
Lemma 1. For any assignment x and migration vector ∆x it holds that
In the following, we consider ∆x to be a migration vector generated by the Imitation Protocol rather than an arbitrary vector. In this case, ∆x is a random variable and all probabilities and expectations are taken with respect to the Imitation Protocol. In order to prove that the potential decreases in expectation, we derive a bound on the size of the error terms. We show that the error terms reduce the virtual potential gain by at most a factor of two, or, put another way, that the true potential gain is at least half of the virtual potential gain.
Lemma 2. Let x denote a state and let the random variable ∆x denote a migration vector generated by the Imitation Protocol. Then,
Proof. For any given round, each term in V P Q , P, Q ∈ P and F e , e ∈ E can be associated with an agent. Fix an agent i migrating from, say, P to Q. Its contribution to the V P Q (x, ∆x) is −∆ P Q (x) = Q (x + 1 Q − 1 P ) − P (x) (this is the same for all agents moving from P to Q). It may also contribute to F e , e ∈ P ∪ Q. The general idea of the proof is to split and allocate V P Q (x, ∆x) and e F e (x, ∆x) in a suitable manner to migrating agents that shows that the total error reduces the total virtual potential gain by no more than a half.
While agent i contributes −∆ P Q to V P Q (x, ∆x), bounding its contribution to e F e (x, ∆x) to at most ∆ P Q /2 is non-trivial. The contribution depends on ∆x e and whether i migrates towards or away from e. Deriving suitable upper and lower bounds on these contributions depending on whether i migrates towards e or away from e is the central technical challenge in the proof.
For characterizing the error contribution we consider subsets N ⊂ N of the agents and assume that they are ordered with respect to ascending migration probabilities µ P j Q j , in which P j and Q j denote the origin and destination path of agent j ∈ N . Ties are broken arbitrarily.
Fix an edge e ∈ Q \ P and let A + (e) denote the set of agents migrating to e ∈ Q \ P . Let ∆x e denote the number of agents in A + (e) which occur in our ordering with respect to µ P Q before agent i. Agent i's contribution to F e (x, ∆x), e ∈ Q \ P , is upper bounded by ∆˜ e (∆x e ) where we define the error function ∆˜ e (δ) = e (x e +1+δ)− e (x e +1). In this case, we forgot about the positive effects agents departing from e might have. For an illustration, see Figure 1 . For brevity, let us write e = e (x e ) and + e = e (x e + 1) as well as P = P (x) and + Q = P (x e + 1 Q − 1 P ). For e ∈ Q \ P we show below that
Now, fix an edge e ∈ P \ Q and let A − (e) denote the set of agents migrating away from e ∈ P \ Q. Let ∆x e denote the number of agents in A − (e) which occur in our ordering with respect to µ P Q before agent i. Agent i's contribution to F e (x, ∆x), e ∈ P \ Q is lower bounded by ∆˜ e (∆x e ) where ∆˜ e (δ) is defined as above. Hence, we forgot about the positive effects agents migrating towards e might have. For e ∈ P \ Q we show below that
Thus, the expected sum of the error terms of an agent migrating from P to Q is at most
i. e., half of its virtual potential gain, which proves the lemma. It remains to show Inequalities (1) and (2). Here we restrict to the case of e ∈ Q \ P , where Q denotes the destination path of agent i. The other cases are very similar.
For brevity, let us write I P Q = ∆ P Q / P for the incentive to migrate from P to Q. Again, consider the case that e ∈ Q where Q denotes the destination path of agent i. Then, due to our ordering of the agents,
implying Subsequently, we consider two cases depending on the expected migration towards an edge e. e (x)
x ∆x e x e e (x)
x Figure 1 : Potential gain of an agent migrating from edge e towards edge e. The hatched area is the agent's virtual potential gain. The shaded area on the left is this agents contribution to the error term, caused by the ∆x e agents ranking before the agent under consideration (with respect to µ P Q ). There are two sub-cases:
In order to bound the expected latency increase, we apply the elasticity bound on e :
Now, splitting up the sum, we define ≤ e 8 since k ≤ 8x e /d , and convexity of the exponential function. Additionally, we use the observation that ∞ k=1 e −k (ln k) · k ≤ 2 and Inequality (3) .
For the second part of the sum, let Here we use that x e > d and k ≥ 8 x e d ≥ 8. Using facts about geometric sums and x e > d, we have
Reassembling the sum, we obtain
Again, by the same arguments as at the end of Case 1 this proves Equation (1) if λ is less than 1/(2e 8 + 8).
Case 2b: x e ≤ d. In this case we separate the upper bound on Λ e = E ∆˜ e (∆x e ) into the section up to d and above d. For the first section we use the fact that each additional agent on resource e causes a latency increase of at most ν e as long as the load is at most d. We define the contribution to the expected latency increase by the events that up to d − x e join resource e, i. e., afterwards the congestion is still at most d. In this case, we may use ν e to bound the contribution of each agent:
where we use that d−x e k=2 e −k (ln(k)−1) · k ≤ 8 and E [∆x e ] < 1/64.
For the contribution of the agents increasing the load on resource e to above d we use the elasticity constraint again. This time, we do not consider the latency increase with respect to + e (x e ) but with respect to e (d):
Similar to case (2a),
Consider the series in the above expression as a function of u = (d − x e ) and denote it by S(u). Note that S(u) converges for every u ≥ 0 and S(u) → 0 as u → ∞. In particular, S(u) < 8 for any u ≥ 0, so
Since (d − x e ) · e −(d−x e ) < 1/2, we have L 2 ≤ 4 ( e (x e ) + ν e ) · E [∆x e ]. Altogether,
where we use Equation (3) Note that all migrating agents add a negative contribution to the virtual potential gain since they migrate only from paths with currently higher latency to paths with lower latency. Hence, together with Lemma 2, we can derive the next corollary.
Corollary 3. Consider a symmetric network congestion game Γ and let x and x denote states of Γ such that x is a random state generated after one round of executing the Imitation Protocol. Then, E [Φ(x )] ≤ Φ(x) with strict inequality as long as x is not imitation-stable. Thus, Φ is a super-martingale.
It is obvious that the sequence of states generated by the Imitation Protocol terminates at an imitation-stable state. From Lemma 2 we can immediately derive an upper bound on the time to reach such a state. However, since for arbitrary latency functions the minimum possible latency gain may be very small, this bound can clearly be only pseudo-polynomial. To see this, consider a state in which only one agent can make an improvement. Then, the expected time until the agent moves is inverse proportional to its latency gain. Proof. By definition of the Imitation Protocol, the expected virtual potential gain in any state x which is not yet imitation-stable is at least −ν · λ d n · ν max . Hence, also the expected potential gain E [∆Φ(x )] in every intermediate state x of the dynamics is bounded from above by at least half of the above value. From this, it follows, that the expected time until the potential drops from at most Φ(x) to the minimum potential Φ * > 0 is at
Formally, this is a consequence of a well-known argument given for instance in [14] .
It is obvious that this result cannot be significantly improved since we can easily construct an instance and a state such that the only possible improvement that can be made is ν. Hence, already a single step takes pseudopolynomially long. In case of polynomial latency functions Theorem 4 reads as follows.
Corollary 5. Consider a symmetric network congestion game with polynomial latency functions with maximum degree d and minimum and maximum coefficients a min and a max , respectively. Then the dynamics converges to an imitation-stable state in expected time
In case of a singleton congestion game with monimial latency function we can improve the corollary as follows. Let us remark that all proofs in this section do not rely on the assumption that the underlying congestion game is symmetric. In fact, the lemma also holds for asymmetric congestion games in which each agent samples only among agents that have the same strategy space.
Convergence to Approximate Equilibria
Theorem 4 guarantees convergence of concurrent imitation dynamics generated by the Imitation Protocol to an imitation-stable state in the long run. However, it does not give a reasonable bound on the time due to the small progress that can be made. Hence, as our main result, we present bounds on the time to reach an approximate equilibrium. Here we relax the definition of an imitation-stable state in two aspects: We allow only a small minority of agents to deviate by more than a small amount from the average latency. Our notion of an approximate equilibrium is similar to the notion used in [7, 15, 17] . It is motivated by the following observation. When sampling other agents each agent gets to know its latency if it would adopt that agents' strategy. Hence to some extent each agent can compute the average latency L + av and determine if its own latency is above or below that average. 
Intuitively, a state at (δ, ,ν)-equilibrium is a state in which almost all agents are almost satisfied when comparing their own situation with the situation of other agents. One may hope that it is possible to reach a state in which all agents are almost satisfied quickly . This would be a relaxation of the concept of Nash equilibrium. We will argue below, however, that there is no rapid convergence to such states.
Theorem 7. For an arbitrary initial assignment x(0), let τ denote the first round in which the Imitation Protocol reaches a (δ, ,ν)-equilibrium. Then,
Proof. We consider a state x(t) that is not at a (δ, ,ν)equilibrium and derive a lower bound on the expected potential gain. There are two cases. Either at least half of the agents utilizing paths in P ,ν utilize paths in P + ,ν or at least half of them utilize paths in P − ,ν .
Case 1: Many agents use expensive paths, i. e., P ∈P + ,ν x P ≥ δ n/2. We denote the set of paths with ex-post latency at most (1 + )L + av by Q = {Q ∈ P : 
We now give a lower bound on the expected virtual potential gain given that the current state is not at a (δ, ,ν)equilibrium. For spatial reasons we define V Φ = P,Q V P Q . We consider only the contribution of agents utilizing paths in P + ,ν and sampling paths with ex-post latency of at most (1 + ) L + av :
where the last inequality follows using Jensen's inequality and substituting P ≥ L + av . Now we substitute P ≥ (1 + ) L + av and use the fact that the squared expression is monotone in P . Furthermore, we substitute the definition of T and C to obtain
We can now use the tradeoff shown for T in Equation (6), C ≤ L + av , and P ∈P + ,ν x P > δ n/2 to obtain
Since nL + av ≥ Φ, we have by Lemma 2 that E [Φ(x(t + 1))] ≤ Φ(x(t)) 1 − Ω 2 ·δ d . Case 2: Many agents use cheap paths, i. e., P ∈P − ,ν x P ≥ δ n/2. This time, we define the volume T and average latency C of paths which are potential origins of agents migrating towards P − ,ν . We let
Similarly as in Case 1 we now give a lower bound on the contribution to the virtual potential gain caused by agents with latency at least (1 − )L av sampling agents in P − ,ν .
We rearrange the sum and apply Jensen's inequality to ob-tain
Finally, using the trade-off for T from Equation (7) and C T ≤ L av , we get
In both cases, the potential decreases by at least a factor of (1 − Ω( 2 δ/d)) in expectation, which implies that the expected time to reach a state with Φ(x(t)) ≤ Φ * is at most the time stated in the theorem.
Corollary 8. Consider a symmetric network congestion game with polynomial latency functions with maximum degree d and minimum and maximum coefficients a min and a max , respectively. Then the dynamics converges to an (δ, ,ν)-
Let us remark that (δ, ,ν)-equilibria are transient. They can be left again once they are reached, e.g., if the average latency decreases or if agents migrate towards low-latency paths. However, our proofs actually do not only bound the time until a (δ, ,ν)-equilibrium is reached for the first time, but rather the expected total number of rounds in which the system is not at a (δ, ,ν)-equilibrium.
In the definition of (δ, ,ν)-equilibria we require the majority of agents to deviate by no more than a small amount from L + av . This is because the expected latency of a path sampled by an agent is L av , but the latency of the destination path becomes larger if the agent migrates. We use L + av as an upper bound in our proof, although we could use a slightly smaller quantity in cases where the origin Q and the destination P intersect, namely P (x + 1 P − 1 Q ). Using an average over P and Q of this quantity rather than L + av results in a slightly stronger definition of (δ, ,ν)-equilibria.
Here we used the weaker definition for the sake of clarity.
Finally we outline fundamental limitations to fast convergence. One could hope to show fast convergence towards a state in which δ = 0 and all agents are approximately satisfied. Any protocol that proceeds by sampling either a strategy or an agent and then possibly migrates, takes at least expected time Ω(n) to reach a state in which all agents sustain a latency that is within a constant factor of L + av . To see this, consider an instance with n = 2 m agents and identical linear latency functions. Now, let x 1 = 3, x 2 = 1 and x i = 2 for 3 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, the probability that one of the agents currently using resource 1 samples resource 2 is at most O (1/m) = O (1/n). Since this is the only possible improvement step, this yields the desired bound.
SINGLETON GAMES AND THE PRICE OF IMITATION
In this section, we improve on our previous results and consider the special case of singleton congestion games. A major drawback of the Imitation Protocol is that agents who rely on this protocol cannot access any edges which are unused in the starting state of the dynamics. Even worse, although an edge that has been used initially, it can become unused in later states. It is clear, however, that when starting from a random initial distribution of agents among the edges, the probability of emptying an edge becomes increasingly unlikely as the number of agents increases.
Subsequently, we formalize this statement in the following sense. Consider a family of singleton congestion games over the same set of edges with latency functions without offsets. Then, the probability that an edge becomes unused is exponentially small in the number of agents. To this end, consider a vector of continuous latency functions L = ( e ) i∈[m] with e : [0, 1] → R ≥0 . To use these functions for games with a finite number of agents, we have to normalize them appropriately. For any such function ∈ L, let n with n (x) = (x/n) denotes the respective scaled function. We may think of this as having n agents with weight 1/n each. Note that this transformation leaves the elasticity unchanged, whereas the step size ν decreases as n increases. For a vector of latency functions L = ( e ) i∈[m] , let L n = ( n e ) i∈[m] .
Theorem 9. Fix a vector of latency functions L with e (0) = 0 for all i ∈ [m]. For the singleton congestion game over L n with n agents, the probability that the Imitation Protocol with random initialization generates a state with x e = 0 for some i ∈ [m] within poly(n) rounds is bounded by 2 −Ω(n) .
The proof of this theorem is given in the full version. It does not only show that edges do not become empty with high probability, but also that the congestion does not fall below any constant congestion value. Since this is the only place where our analysis relies on the parameter ν. If the number of agents is large, we can remove ν from the protocol, and the dynamics converge to an exact Nash equilibrium with high probability.
The previous theorem shows that it is unlikely for resources to become unused when the granularity of an agent decreases. If the instance, i. e., the latency functions and the number of users, is fixed, it is an interesting question, how much the performance can suffer from the fact that the Imitation Protocol is not innovative. We measure this degradation of performance by introducing the Price of Imitation which is defined as the ratio between the expected social cost of the state to which the Imitation Protocol converges, denoted I Γ , and the optimum social cost. The expectation is taken over the random choices of the Imitation Protocol, including random initialization.
We answer this question here for the case of linear latency functions of the form e (x) = a e x. Then, d = 1 is an upper bound on the elasticity and ν = a max = max e∈E {a e }. Choosing the average latency SC(x) = e∈E (x e /n) · e (x e ) as the social cost measure, we show in Theorem 10 that the Price of Imitation is bounded by a constant. It is, however, obvious that the same also holds if we consider the maximum latency as social cost function.
The performance of the dynamics can be artificially degraded by introducing an extremely slow edge. Thus, a max can be chosen extremely large such that any state is imitationstable. However, such a resource can be removed from the instance without harming the optimal solution at all since it would not be used anyhow. We will call such resources useless and make this notion precise below.
Let us give a rough outline of the proof. For a set of resources M , let A M = e∈M 1 a e and let A Γ = A [m] . We do not compare the outcome of the Imitation Protocol to the optimum solution, but rather to a lower bound, namely the optimal fractional solution. The optimal fractional solutionx e can be computed asx e = n/(A Γ a e ). For this solution, the latency of all resources is a e ·x e = n/A Γ . A resource is useless ifx e < 1. In the following, we assume that there are no useless resources. Then, we can show that the social cost at an imitation-stable state in which all resources are used, does not differ by more than a small constant from the optimal social cost and that the Price of Imitation is small. In fact, whereas we havex e ≥ 1 for the former statement, for bounding the Price of Imitation we need a slightly stronger assumption, namely that x e = Ω(log n).
Theorem 10. Assume that for the optimal fractional solution,x e = Ω(log n) large enough. The price of imitation is at most (3 + o(1)). In particular, for δ > 0, and any n ≥ n 0 (δ) for a large enough value n 0 (δ) (which is independent of the instance), I Γ ≤ (3 + δ) · n A Γ .
